Introduction z
In science, as everywhere else, seeing is believing. According to James ( 1911 ) , science consists in the substitution of a conceptual order for the perceptual order of experience. Russell (1921) insisted that scientific theory should be founded upon perceptual experience of some kind. In his terms, 'knowledge by description' presupposes 'knowledge by acquaintance'. To put this principle most colourfully, Wheelwright (1962) described the aim of theory as being to 'chop at the joints' -that is, to mark off resemblances and differences where experience says it is most natural to do so.
For the field of organization studies, this principle is an embarrassment.
Organizations cannot be perceived. and therefore cannot be unambigu-. ously theorized. To the question: 'What is organization theory about'~' there is no easy or ready reply. The research literature offers a dismaying multiplicity of possibilities, not one of which is recognizably definitive. To some authors organization theory is about bureaucracy, to others it is about systems of information and/or energy, to others it is about populations of social forms, to still others it is about modes of exchange (e.g. markets, hierarchies, and clans), and to still others, it is about patterns of meaning or culture. These stopgaps are questionable in the same measure ; for about systems, markets, hierarchies, clans and cultures, there is an equal ration of indefiniteness. Disagreement is possible because perceptive experience offers little to agree about. In this article, we show how the absence of perceptive experience of organizations makes it difficult to theorize about them scientifically. In fundamental respects, ours is an exposition and application of contemporary ethnomethodological critiques of social science (e.g., Garfinkel 1967; 1988; Hilbert 1990) 
Organizations in Doubt
We find it natural to speak of organizations as objects in action. Indeed, our language is built upon a grammar of object and predicate (to the chagrin of advocates of a more fluid language of process, e.g., Whitehead 1933 ; Giddens 1979) . Even though grammatical form is not the same thing as phenomenal form, we are likely to mistake the two when there is no concrete experience to keep them separate. As Wittgenstein (1953: 42-49) pointed out, our problems of thought are primarily grammatical.
A 'main source of our failure to understand', he wrote, 'is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words'.
Uncertain Substance
The problems of studying organizations begin with the difficulty of pointing them out -to gesture and say, This is an organization.' This contrasts with the natural sciences where gesturing and saying are often easier and more convincing. Pointing makes definition easy because it frees us from having to translate what we can see into words. However, in the case of organizations, there is nothing obvious to point to, or to exclaim about. The word 'organization' names something that cannot be seen, and thus that cannot otherwise be confirmed as an object. To be sure, the research literature on organizations offers almost no hint that this is, or could be, a problem. Although it is sometimes acknowledged that the boundaries of organizations are problematic (e.g., Katz and Kahn 1978; Weick 1979) , there is little question that organizations are genuine objects. The overwhelming majority of empirical studies report no difficulties of identification or measurement. For example, in the last 5 years (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) Table 1 for examples). Sometimes the organization is defined as an arrangement or system, typically of persons, activities, or roles (e.g., Barnard 1938; Katz and Kahn 1978; Simon 1976; Weick 1979) . Sometimes it is defined by its functions or purposes (e.g. Selznick 1957; Scott 1981) , and sometimes as something that we just know (e.g. Blau and Scott, 1962; March and Simon, 1958 (1962) (Freeman, 1982: An alternative, which we are hardly the first to suggest, is to see theoretical concepts and perceptive experiences as developing from essentially the same act of mind, and as differing mainly in degree of abstraction (experiences being closer to sensation and theoretical facts farther away). Instead of distinct types, we can imagine a continuum that marks a single route to understanding, with perceptive experiences being nearer the departure point and theoretical concepts nearer the destination. This alternative thus reconceptualizes our usual ideas of both theory and experience. Theoretical concepts become part experiential and perceptive experiences become part theoretical, and there is no clear break or demarcation between the two, but only shadings of emphasis. A significant consequence of this view is that it makes curious our usual idea that experiences are more subjective than theoretical concepts. Rather, it suggests that the latter actually involve more of the mind in their making and thus have more of the subject in them. Although the thing-like appearance of theoretical concepts may suggest objectivity, when we follow these 'disembodied' ideas back to their sources, we go back upon a process of abstraction that is as subjective as can be. This view of theory and experience led Dewey (1958: 8) to reserve a special meaning for the word 'experience' because it 'recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality'. Similarly, James (1904) Sandelands and St. Clair 1992) or to the feeling of 'communitas' that has been identified with tribal or religious gatherings (Turner . 1974 (Zald 1993 (1950) points out, is an exacting discipline. 
